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FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECLINES TO FIND PATENT CLAIMS
INDEFINITE FOR BROAD DESCRIPTIVE WORDS
(AND AN ODE TO 1L CIVIL PROCEDURE)
Niazi Licensing Corporation v. St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc.,
30 F.4th 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ♦
In a recent decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) handed down a ruling on the definiteness
prong of patentability. 1 While the case tackled multiple issues on
appeal, this Comment primarily focuses on two: whether claims are
invalid for use of descriptive words or terms of degree, and whether
sanctions are appropriate for failing to disclose predicate facts during
discovery. 2 First, the panel unanimously disagreed with the district
court’s analysis of claims containing two descriptive terms, “resilient”
and “pliable,” and reversed the judgment holding claims indefinite for
use of these terms. 3 Ultimately, while the disputed terms were broad,
they were not uncertain to a skilled artisan and did not amount to purely
subjective terms that changed with a person’s opinion. 4 Next, while
the panel upheld the district court’s order of sanctions, Niazi missed an
opportunity to have the panel weigh in on the appropriate test for the
exclusion of previously undisclosed evidence. 5 This outcome is an
important reminder that procedural posture can have a ripple effect on
downstream infringement claims. 6
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-Appellant Niazi Licensing Corporation (“Niazi”) is
the owner of U.S. Patent No. 6,638,268 (the “’268 patent”), titled
“Catheter to Cannulate the Coronary Sinus.” 7 Defendant-Appellee St.
By Janelle Barbier, J.D. Candidate, Santa Clara University School of
Law, 2023. I am forever grateful to my 1L civil procedure professor, Marina
Hsieh, for my love of procedure.
1
See Niazi Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 30 F.4th 1339,
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Under the definiteness requirement, patent claims must
particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter regarded as the
invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶2. The ’268 patent was issued in 2003 and
is governed by the pre-AIA regime.
2
See Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1346–47.
3
Judge Bryson, Judge Stoll, and Judge Taranto sat on the three-judge
panel. See id. at 1342, 1346.
4
See id. at 1349–50.
5
See id. at 1354.
6
An analysis of how the procedural question could have affected Niazi’s
claim of infringement is discussed infra, Section III.
7
Niazi Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1078,
1079 (D. Minn. 2018).
♦
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Jude Medical S.C., Inc. (“St. Jude”) manufactures and sells medical
devices, including a “telescoping catheter system” (the accused
product). 8 The ’268 patent is directed to resynchronization therapy––
a method of treating heart failure that uses electrical leads to keep both
sides of the heart consistently contracting together. 9 The invention
improves this therapy through the use of a double catheter––
comprising an outer and inner catheter––that makes it easier to pass a
lead into the veins of the heart. 10
Claim 1 is directed to an apparatus and is representative of the
claims on appeal for indefiniteness; the claim recites, in relevant part:
1. A double catheter, comprising:
an outer, resilient catheter having shape memory . . . ;
an inner, pliable catheter slidably disposed in the outer
catheter . . . . 11
Claim 13––dependent on claim 1––further defines the outer catheter as
having “sufficient stiffness”; other dependent claims provide
exemplary resilient materials for constructing the outer catheter, such
as “braided silastic.” 12
The specification describes the outer catheter as having
“sufficient shape memory to return to its original shape when
undistorted” and a “braided design,” with resilience providing for
“torque control and stiffness.” 13 It also provides examples of materials
that can be used to make the inner catheter, such as silicone; it further
explains that the inner layer lacks longitudinal braiding, making it
flexible, and that it is more flexible than the outer catheter.14
Claim 11 survived the invalidity challenge and is directed to a
method of using the double catheter to place a lead in the coronary
sinus vein. 15 The claim recites, in relevant part:
11. A method . . .using a double catheter . . .
comprising:
inserting the catheter into the coronary sinus;
8

Id.
Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1343.
10
Id. (citing ’268 patent Abstract).
11
Id. (citing ’268 patent col. 6 l. 62–col. 7 l. 9) (emphases added to
disputed limitation).
12
Id. at 1349 (citing ’268 patent col. 8 ll. 13–27, 33–34).
13
Id. (citing ’268 patent col. 4 ll. 21–23, col. 5 ll. 4–6, col. 3 ll. 11–13).
14
Id. (citing ’268 patent col. 3 ll. 13–15, col. 5 ll. 13–18).
15
Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1344.
9
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advancing a guide wire through the catheter into a
coronary sinus lateral branch vein;
advancing the inner catheter out of a front end opening
of the outer catheter along the guide wire into the
branch vein . . . . 16
Niazi alleged that St. Jude’s products directly infringed the
’268 patent and that St. Jude’s instructions for use (“IFU”) induced its
customers, mainly doctors, to infringe when performing
resynchronization therapy. 17 To support its allegations, Niazi
submitted an expert report from its technical expert, Dr. Martin Burke,
stating that Dr. Burke himself had directly infringed claim 11 when
using St. Jude’s products. 18
In 2017, Niazi sued St. Jude for direct and indirect patent
infringement in the District of Minnesota. 19 St. Jude’s claims for
induced, contributory, and willful infringement all survived motions
for dismissal; the claim for direct infringement was not challenged at
this stage. 20 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
held that all but one of the asserted claims of the ’268 patent were
indefinite––on the lone claim that survived, summary judgment of
noninfringement was entered following resolution of evidentiary
motions. 21 As to direct infringement, the district court found that St.
Jude’s instructions for use (“IFU”) did not direct users to complete
steps in the same order required by claim 11. 22
During pre-trial proceedings in the district court, St. Jude
moved to strike portions of Dr. Burke’s expert report on the basis that
the report relied on facts not disclosed during discovery and that Niazi
had not identified Dr. Burke as a potential fact witness. 23 The district
16
Id. at 1343–44 (citing ’268 patent col. 7 l. 63–col. 8 l. 9) (emphases
added to disputed limitation).
17
Id. at 1344–45.
18
Id. at 1344.
19
See id. at 1342, 1344; see also Niazi Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude Med.
S.C., Inc., No. 17-CV-5096, 2021 WL 4947712, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 25,
2021).
20
See Niazi, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 1079.
21
Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1344–45 (citing Niazi Licensing Corp. v. Bos. Sci.
Corp., No. 17-CV-5094, 2019 WL 5304922, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2019),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded sub nom. Niazi, 30 F.4th 1339 (district
court’s ruling on indefiniteness); Niazi Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude Med. S.C.,
Inc., No. 17-CV-5096, 2021 WL 1111074, at *8 (D. Minn. Mar. 23, 2021)
(district court’s ruling on infringement)).
22
Id. at 1345.
23
Id. at 1344.
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court agreed with St. Jude, excluding the evidence under Rule 37 and
precluding Dr. Burke from testifying as a fact witness. 24 The district
court also assessed monetary sanctions against Niazi for failing to
disclose predicate facts during discovery and excluded portions of its
damages expert report as unreliable. 25
The Federal Circuit affirmed each of the district court’s
rulings, except on invalidity––the panel reversed the judgment on
indefiniteness and remanded the case to determine the issue of
infringement and to assess St. Jude’s remaining invalidity defenses. 26
II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Niazi brought four issues on appeal. First, it challenged the
district’s court’s determination that the terms “resilient” and “pliable”
rendered all but one claim indefinite. 27 Because all apparatus claims
were invalidated for indefiniteness, Niazi could only pursue an indirect
infringement claim for its remaining method claim.28 Second, it
contested the district court’s ruling on induced infringement of Claim
11––the only claim to survive summary judgment––and disagreed that
the elements of direct infringement and specific intent to encourage
infringement were not proven. 29 Third, Niazi argued that the district
court abused its discretion in assessing monetary sanctions and attorney
fees against it, as well as excluding evidence that it submitted, for
repeatedly failing to disclose facts during discovery. 30 Finally, Niazi
disputed that its damages expert report was unreliable and speculative
due to failure of its expert to apportion damages when calculating the
royalty base. 31
Writing for the panel, Judge Stoll first addressed the issue of
definiteness––a statutory requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112––by
24
Id. at 1344–45. “Rule 37” refers to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37
in this Comment.
25
Id. at 1344 (citing Niazi Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., No.
17-CV-5096, 2020 WL 1617879, at *1–3 (D. Minn. Apr. 2, 2020) (district
court’s ruling on sanctions); Niazi Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc.,
No. 17-CV-5096, 2020 WL 5512507, at *9–11 (D. Minn. Sept. 14, 2020)
(district court’s ruling on damages report)).
26
See id. at 1342–43.
27
Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1344.
28
“As a result of the various exclusion orders (and a ruling on
inadmissibility of certain evidence that is not challenged on appeal), Niazi’s
induced infringement case rested on St. Jude’s IFU for use (IFUs) for its CPS
catheter.” Id. at 1345.
29
Id. at 1345.
30
Id. at 1353–56.
31
Id. at 1356–57.
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laying out the Nautilus standard. 32 This requirement serves the
important policy goal of providing notice to the public of what is
claimed and “mandates clarity, while recognizing that absolute
precision is unattainable.” 33 When a patentee uses descriptive words
or terms of degree in claim language, the key inquiry is whether the
language provides objective boundaries to a skilled artisan when read
in context of the invention. 34 And “a claim is not indefinite just because
it is broad.” 35
Next, the panel recounted cases where the Federal Circuit
decided the definiteness of descriptive words and terms of degree in
claim language. Starting with cases where terms of degree were found
to meet the definiteness standard, two cases were instructive. 36 First,
the phrase “visually negligible,” in a claim element of a graphical
indicator, was defined by the claim language itself––“whether it could
be seen by the normal human eye.” 37 The prosecution history was also
highly relevant; the examiner understood the meaning of the phrase
through prosecution, as did both parties’ experts during the course of
litigation. 38 Second, the term “not interfering substantially” was
definite due to the written description and prosecution history
providing examples with which a skilled artisan could compare an
accused product to. 39
Turning to cases where terms of degree rendered claims
indefinite, the predominant theme was that the intrinsic and extrinsic
evidence “provided insufficient guidance as to any objective
boundaries for the claims.” 40 The panel started with a classic example

See id. at 1346 (citing Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572
U.S. 898, 901 (2014)) (“A claim is indefinite only if, when ‘read in light of
the specification’ and ‘prosecution history,’ it ‘fail[s] to inform, with
reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the
invention.’”).
33
Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1346 (citing Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 910).
34
Id. at 1347.
35
Id.
36
See id. at 1347–48.
37
Id. at 1347 (citing Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370,
1371–73, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
38
Id. at 1348.
39
In the disputed claim language, the term “not interfering substantially”
applied to a chemical compound’s ability to associate with a nucleic acid,
based on interference caused by a linkage group. Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1348
(citing Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1329, 1334–35
(Fed. Cir. 2010)).
40
See id.
32
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of a purely subjective term: “aesthetically pleasing.” 41 In that case,
nothing in the record supplied a standard for measuring the scope of
the phrase––the scope changed depending on a person’s subjective
determination. 42 Similarly, the term “QoS requirements” was
indefinite because it was defined by what characteristic was most
important to a user, making it dependent “on the unpredictable vagaries
of any one person’s opinion.” 43 In sum, the scope of a claim cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty when it employs purely
subjective terms. 44
As indefiniteness is reviewed de novo, the panel concluded by
reviewing the evidence presented in the district court. 45 The intrinsic
evidence, of the claim language read in light of the specification, was
enough to resolve the issue. 46 Claim 1’s language conveyed that the
resilient outer catheter must have “shape memory.” 47 And the written
description provided exemplary materials for each catheter. 48 The
panel found St. Jude’s reliance on a single sentence in the written
description unpersuasive because the specification explained that each
catheter must have degrees of stiffness and flexibility that were relative
to each other. 49 Therefore, the claim terms at issue were not “purely
subjective terms” and did not give rise to variable claim scope
“depending on the particular eye of any one observer.” 50 In other
words, taken as a whole, the intrinsic record provided a standard for
measuring the scope of the terms. 51
See id. (citing Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d
1342, 1345, 1349–56 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
42
Id.
43
Id. (citing Intellectual Ventures I, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 902 F.3d
1372, 1375–76, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
44
The Federal Circuit “drew a similar conclusion as to the claim phrase
‘unobtrusive manner that does not distract the viewer.’” Id. (citing Interval
Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371–74 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
45
See Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1345 (“Definiteness is a question of law that we
review de novo.”), 1349.
46
See id. at 1349.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
St. Jude argued that Niazi was inconsistent in its description of the
terms at issue, pointing to a sentence in the written description that stated that
both catheters “preferably have a predetermined shape and a certain degree of
stiffness to maintain such shape . . . but still flexible enough to bend when
required.” The panel responded that “the outer catheter has a greater degree
of stiffness and less flexibility compared to the inner catheter.” See id. at 1350
(citing Niazi, 2019 WL 5304922, at *6).
50
Id. at 1349–50.
51
Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1349.
41

2022]

AN ODE TO 1L CIVIL PROCEDURE

119

Moreover, the extrinsic evidence of dictionary definitions
buttressed the panel’s conclusion on definiteness, illustrating that the
plain language would have understood meanings by skilled artisans. 52
The panel held that the claims using the terms “resilient” and “pliable”
were not indefinite because the “terms, when read in light of the
intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, inform those skilled in the art about
the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” 53
Moving to the issue of infringement on claim 11, the panel
began with the first part of an infringement analysis: claim
construction. 54 The panel agreed with the district court that “St. Jude’s
IFUs recite the steps required by claim 11 in an order opposite to that
required by claim 11 (as construed)”; thus, direct infringement could
not be proven. 55 Because an essential element of indirect infringement
was lacking, the panel declined to reach the issue of whether Niazi
presented evidence that St. Jude acted with the requisite specific intent
to support the claim. 56
The remaining issues were reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. 57 In sum, the panel concluded that the court did
not abuse its discretion in any of its decisions regarding the evidentiary
motions and sanctions. 58
But hiding in this pile of motions was an interesting question
on civil procedure: whether the Eighth Circuit’s four-factor test for
exclusion of previously undisclosed evidence had survived Rule 37’s
enactment. 59 Consistent with Federal Circuit precedent, the panel
reviewed the district court’s decision to issue sanctions under Rule 37
under the law of the Eighth Circuit, which employs an abuse of
discretion standard. 60 Niazi argued that the district court abused its
discretion in applying the four-factor test. 61 However, as the panel
pointed out, the district court did not rely on the four factors; instead,
52
See id. at 1350 (quoting Dictionary.com) (explaining that “‘resilient’ is
defined as ‘returning to the original form or position after being bent,
compressed, or stretched’” and that “‘pliable’ [] is defined as ‘easily bent,
flexible, supple’”).
53
See id.
54
See id. at 1350–53.
55
See id. at 1353.
56
See id. at 1351.
57
See Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1353, 1356.
58
See id. at 1353, 1355, 1358.
59
See id. at 1354 n.4.
60
See id. at 1353 (citing Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290
F.3d 1364, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Vanderberg v. Petco Animal Supplies
Stores, Inc., 906 F.3d 698, 702 (8th Cir. 2018)).
61
Id. at 1354.
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it analyzed whether Niazi’s failures were “substantially justified or
harmless” under Rule 37(c)(1). 62 And because Niazi did not challenge
the actual basis for the district court’s conclusion––nor the court’s
determination that it need not consider the four-factor test––the Federal
Circuit declined to reweigh the factors on appeal. 63
Moreover, even assuming, without deciding, that the fourfactor test was controlling, the panel found that Niazi had not identified
a legal or factual error in the district court’s decision to not analyze the
factors. 64 Because of this omission by Niazi, the panel affirmed the
district court’s rulings without reaching the procedural question. 65
III.

DISCUSSION

There are two important takeaways from this case. First, the
case summarizes nicely what to do––and what not to do––to avoid an
indefiniteness holding when drafting claims with terms of degree. If
possible, define the terms in the claim language itself. In the case of
“resilient,” for example, the term could almost be seen as superfluous,
given that its definition was contained in the same claim. Recall that
claim 1 recited “a resilient catheter having shape memory.” 66 And the
dictionary definition––provided by the Federal Circuit––specified that
“resilient” meant “returning to its original form or position after being
[manipulated].” 67 Thus, “resilient” likely could have stood on its own
because its standard definition mirrored that intended by the claim
language. This point is illustrated in the term “pliable” being defined
by its plain and ordinary meaning despite that term standing alone in
the claim language.
In addition to clear claim language, use the specification to
resolve any doubts of ambiguity. Providing examples gives a person
skilled in the art a reference point for which to compare accused
products and allows that person to opine on claim scope with
reasonable certainty, as required under Nautilus. A patent’s written
description can also be used to compare claim elements––it is not
necessary to venture outside the invention as comparing elements
within a claim can provide a reference range. Utilizing the
specification in this manner provides the objective standard with which
to measure a claim’s scope by––the gold standard in an indefiniteness
62
See id. The district court relied on the principles articulated in
Vanderberg v. Petco, discussed infra. See Niazi, 2020 WL 1617879, at *2.
63
See Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1354 n.4.
64
See id.
65
See id. at 1354.
66
See id. at 1343 (citing ’268 patent col. 6 l. 62–col. 7 l. 9).
67
See id. at 1350.
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analysis. 68 Finally, dictionary definitions can bolster the interpretation
of claim language, especially when the meaning ascribed by a patent
owner aligns with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term in
everyday use.
A Note For Civil Procedure Nerds
Finally, the case is a reminder that it is important to preserve,
and articulate, objections based on civil procedure as much as with
issues concerning substantive patent law. This is especially salient
under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. 69 The remainder of
this Comment analyzes the procedural question alluded to by the
Federal Circuit––whether the Eighth Circuit’s common law tests
remain viable in light of Rule 37––and whether preserving the issue for
appeal would have changed the outcome for Niazi. On appeal, Niazi
would need to show two things to prevail: (1) the district court abused
its discretion; and (2) that error resulted in prejudice to Niazi. 70
As a threshold matter, for procedural issues that are not
intertwined with substantive patent law, the law of the regional circuit
governs. 71 In addition, this issue presents a classic preemption question
on whose rules control procedure in federal court. At first blush, the
Erie doctrine may come to mind; law students and practitioners alike
will almost certainly recall this doctrine which permeates much of the
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly referred to the need to define
a claim’s “objective boundaries.” See, e.g., Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d
1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding claims indefinite for use of the term
“minimal redundancy” because they lacked objective boundaries);
Guangdong Alison Hi-Tech Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 936 F.3d 1353, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding claims definite because the written description
provided objective boundaries for the claim term “lofty . . . batting”).
69
“The question, of course, is not whether this Court, or whether the Court
of Appeals, would as an original matter have dismissed the action; it is whether
the District Court abused its discretion in so doing.” Nat'l Hockey League v.
Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (explaining that the record
supported the district court’s decision to issue sanctions under Rule 37).
70
See Wegener v. Johnson, 527 F.3d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining
that even if a district court abuses its discretion, the appellant must also show
that affirming the error would result in “fundamental unfairness”); see also
Petrone v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 940 F.3d 425, 436 (8th Cir. 2019)
(“Notwithstanding the district court's error, we will affirm unless Defendants
can show the error was not harmless.”).
71
The Federal Circuit “review[s] procedural matters, that are not unique
to patent issues, under the law of the particular regional circuit court where
appeals from the district court would normally lie.” See Panduit Corp. v. All
States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
68
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civil procedure curriculum. 72 As a refresher, Erie says that federal
courts must apply state substantive law and federal procedural law
when sitting in diversity. 73
True, this is not a diversity case. But as commentators have
pointed out, “in instances in which the relevant regional circuit has not
addressed the particular procedural issue before the Federal Circuit,”
the court’s choice of law process “strikingly resembles the
methodology federal courts undertake” when applying the Erie
doctrine. 74 In this situation, the court seeks to step into the shoes of the
regional circuit. 75 Moreover, when it comes to interpreting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Circuit has indicated that
generally, it defers to the regional circuit. 76 And the court has
previously addressed Rule 37 in a panoply of cases. 77
Armed with this choice of law framework, we can analyze the
facts in this case. When determining whether to exclude previously
undisclosed evidence, the Eighth Circuit has traditionally relied on two
different tests. 78 Niazi focused on one of the tests which consists of

The Erie doctrine originated from Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
73
See id. at 78 (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
state.”), 92 (Reed, J., concurring in part) (“no one doubts federal power over
procedure”).
74
See Jennifer E. Sturiale, A Balanced Consideration of the Federal
Circuit’s Choice-of-Law Rule, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 475, 487 (2020).
75
See id. (citing Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1575) (explaining that the Federal
Circuit seeks to “predict how that regional circuit would have decided the
issue in light of the decisions of that circuit’s various district courts, [and]
public policy”). The court also considers “whether there is a consensus among
the regional circuits, the need to promote uniformity in patent law, and the
nature of the legal issue involved”––it generally conforms its law “to that of
the regional circuits when there exists expressed uniformity among the
circuits.” Id. at 490 (citing Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., 76
F.3d 1178, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
76
However, deference to regional circuit law is inappropriate in some
cases. See Manildra, 76 F.3d at 1181–82.
77
See Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 857 n.10
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (collecting cases) (describing cases where the Federal Circuit
reviewed district courts’ application of Rule 37).
78
See Marti v. City of Maplewood, Mo., 57 F.3d 680, 683 (8th Cir. 1995)
(“Two similar tests, or sets of factors, have been used by this court to
determine whether a witness's testimony should be excluded if that witness
was not named in the pretrial order.”).
72
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four factors. 79 The second test used by the Eighth Circuit also consists
of four factors. 80 Under such tests, application of the factors is “within
the sound discretion of the district court.” 81
Apart from these common law tests, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure––under Rule 37––allow for “a self-executing sanction for
failure to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a).” 82 The Eighth
Circuit has summarized Rule 37 by explaining that if a party does not
satisfy the disclosure requirements, “the undisclosed information or
expert is excluded unless the failure was substantially justified or
harmless.” 83 District courts in the Eighth Circuit are split on whether
Rule 37 mandates exclusion when an exception does not apply––the
appellate court has not opined on this question. 84
Here, the district court explained that the Eighth Circuit has
been silent on whether a common law test has survived Rule 37’s
enactment, going so far as to state that “contrary to [Niazi]'s argument,
there is no such four-factor test.” 85 Although the Eighth Circuit has
explained that it is not error for district courts to consider this balancing
test in evaluating the admissibility of undisclosed evidence, the district
court reasoned that the circuit’s opinion predated the effective date of
Rule 37. 86 The district court went on to cite an Eighth Circuit case that

79
See Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1354. The factors are: “(1) the reason the party
fails to name the witness; (2) the importance of the testimony; (3) the amount
of time the opposing party needs to properly prepare for the testimony; and
(4) whether a continuance would in some way be useful.” Citizens Bank of
Batesville, Arkansas v. Ford Motor Co., 16 F.3d 965, 966 (8th Cir. 1994).
80
The factors are: “(1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party
against whom the excluded witness would have testified; (2) the ability of that
party to cure the prejudice; (3) the extent to which waiver of the rule against
calling unlisted witnesses would disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the
case or of other cases in the court; and (4) bad faith or willfulness of the party
failing to comply with the court's order.” Marti, 57 F.3d at 683 (citing Morfeld
v. Kehm, 803 F.2d 1452, 1455 (8th Cir.1986)).
81
Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1354 n.4 (citing Citizens, 16 F.3d at 967).
82
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c) advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
83
See Vanderberg, 906 F.3d at 702–03.
84
Id. at 703 n.3.
85
See Niazi, 2020 WL 1617879, at *7.
86
See id. at *7 n.2 (citing Carmody v. Kansas City Bd. of Police Comm'rs,
713 F.3d 401, 405 (8th Cir. 2013)). Rule 37 was first enacted in 1937.
Presumably, the district court was referring to the FRCP’s most recent
amendment which occurred in 2015. However, Rule 37(c)(1) was not changed
in 2015. This alone may be sufficient proof that the Eighth Circuit has not
discarded its factored analysis. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee's
note to 2015 amendment; see also J. Ben Segarra, 2015 Amendments to the
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referred to a mixture of factors taken from both tests, explaining that
the factors apply when fashioning an alternative to Rule 37’s exclusion
sanction, but only upon motion from the aggrieved party. 87
At the heart of the issue is whether Rule 37(c) mandates
exclusion. But even assuming, arguendo, that Rule 37’s exclusion
sanction is compulsory, there is still a question of whether the Rule
applies in a particular case. A review of recent Eighth Circuit cases
reveals that the circuit still considers the factors enumerated in its
precedential cases. For example, in Wegener v. Johnson (cited to by
the district court), the appellate court looked at the importance of the
evidence and the effect that its admission would have on scheduling. 88
This compels the conclusion that––if Rule 37 must be imposed for
disclosure failures that are not harmless nor substantially justified––the
tests are alive and well. In other words, the circuit observes both Rule
37 and its common law precedent––it applies its common law factors
to decide whether a failure to disclose evidence was harmless or
substantially justified.89
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, AM. BAR ASS’N PRAC. POINTS (Jan. 23,
2017).
87
See Niazi, 2020 WL 1617879, at *7 n.2 (citing Wegener, 527 F.3d at
692) (explaining that courts should consider “the reason for noncompliance,
the surprise and prejudice to the opposing party, the extent to which allowing
the information or testimony would disrupt the order and efficiency of the trial,
and the importance of the information or testimony”). Whether Niazi was
required to file a motion to request an alternative sanction is outside the scope
of this Comment and is separate from the purported misapplication of the fourfactor test. However, the Eighth Circuit has said that “[w]here a party fails to
make a timely disclosure, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) provides
the district court with the authority to exclude the late-disclosed materials or
to fashion a lesser penalty than total exclusion.” Vogt v. State Farm Life Ins.
Co., 963 F.3d 753, 771 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2551 (2021).
88
See 527 F.3d at 692 (“a continuance would have postponed a muchdelayed trial, and the testimony was offered to prove a point upon which a
substantial amount of other evidence was presented to the jury”); see also
Hillesheim v. Holiday Stationstores, Inc., 903 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 2018)
(assessing surprise to the opposing party and the usefulness of a continuance);
Jackson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 785 F.3d 1193, 1204 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding that
the opposing party failed to demonstrate surprise); Doe v. Young, 664 F.3d
727, 735–36 (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a continuance is more appropriate
than exclusion to cure unfair surprise); Davis v. U.S. Bancorp, 383 F.3d 761,
765 (8th Cir. 2004) (agreeing with the district court that there was no unfair
surprise to the opposing party).
89
Interestingly, the magistrate judge (whose exclusion order was adopted
by the district court) relied on an opinion that used this exact framework, albeit
from a district court in a different appellate jurisdiction. See Dedmon v. Cont'l
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This brings us to the million-dollar question––would a proper
objection by Niazi have made a difference? The Eighth Circuit makes
clear that if a district court errs in its legal conclusion, it abused its
discretion. 90 As explained above, concluding that the factored tests
were dead was likely legal error. In fact, the Federal Circuit touched
on this oversight. 91 But Niazi could not rely solely on the district
court’s error––it would also need to show that affirming the error
would result in “fundamental unfairness.” 92
Niazi likely could have demonstrated resulting prejudice from
the district court’s refusal to analyze the appropriateness of sanctions
under the factored tests. Notably, the Eighth Circuit’s factors weigh
the harm caused to each party by excluding or admitting the evidence.93
By not using this approach, the district court focused mainly on the
harm that would result to St. Jude if Niazi’s evidence was admitted.94
However, as described below, the harm to Niazi resulting from not
admitting the evidence was arguably greater.
Niazi could have taken aim at the district court’s ruling by
showing that the excluded evidence had strong probative value. 95 In
that sense, its exclusion was not harmless––at least not to Niazi. At the
Federal Circuit, Niazi argued that “St. Jude admits that Dr. Burke's
testimony as a direct infringer was important, which weighs against
exclusion.” 96 Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has placed great weight on the

Airlines, Inc., No. 13-CV-0005-WJM-NYW, 2015 WL 4639737, at *1–5 (D.
Colo. Aug. 5, 2015).
90
See Union Elec. Co. v. Energy Ins. Mut. Ltd., 689 F.3d 968, 970 (8th
Cir. 2012) (“A district court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect
legal standard[.]”). While a district court has discretion over evidentiary
rulings, the Eighth Circuit exercises de novo review over “whether the district
court applied the correct legal standard in exercising that discretion[.]” See
Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir. 2008).
91
See Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1354 n.4 (“Niazi does not challenge the district
court's legal determination that it need not consider these factors.”).
92
See Wegener, 527 F.3d at 690. It is possible that the Eighth Circuit
would view exclusion of evidence, based on “an erroneous view of the law,”
as giving rise to fundamental unfairness. See Davis, 383 F.3d at 765.
93
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has referred to the four-factor test as a
“balancing test.” See Carmody, 713 F.3d at 405.
94
See Niazi, 2020 WL 1617879, at *3 (“NLC's failure to timely produce
such discovery evidence is not harmless simply because any prejudice can be
remedied by a continuance and additional depositions”).
95
See Wegener, 527 F.3d at 694.
96
See Reply Brief of Plaintiff at *23, Niazi, 30 F.4th 1339 (No. 20211864).
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importance of evidence targeted for exclusion. 97 Furthermore, the
circuit instructs that “[w]here the exclusion of evidence is tantamount
to dismissal, a district court may need to first consider the possibility
of lesser sanctions.” 98
Given that Dr. Burke’s testimony was integral––perhaps even
tantamount––to Niazi’s success on the merits of its infringement claim,
its exclusion surely prejudiced Niazi.99 And because the Federal
Circuit would seek to resolve the issue by predicting how the Eighth
Circuit would decide the issue, the importance of this testimony would
weigh strongly against exclusion. 100 The matter became even more
critical because Niazi succeeded in obtaining a reversal of the district
court’s indefiniteness ruling, giving Niazi another chance to prove
infringement.
To be sure, even if Niazi had identified a cognizable legal or
factual error on the exclusion issue, along with resulting prejudice, that
would not equate with an automatic win on its infringement claim. But
it would have earned Niazi a remand; in other words, Niazi would have
lived to fight another day, bringing with it evidence of direct
infringement. And another day in the world of patent litigation is
priceless.

See, e.g., Wegener, 527 F.3d at 693 (explaining that “supplemental
testimony, though relevant, was not that important to [plaintiff]'s case because
it was offered to prove a point in support of which a substantial amount of
other evidence was presented to the jury”).
98
See Vanderberg, 906 F.3d at 704–05.
99
St. Jude argued “that Niazi's induced infringement claim was deficient
because Niazi ‘failed to identify a single instance of direct infringement
underlying its assertion of indirect infringement.’” Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1354.
100
See MLC Intell. Prop., LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., 10 F.4th 1358,
1370–73 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (analyzing a district court’s ruling to exclude
evidence under Rule 37 by looking to the law of the regional circuit); see also
Askan v. FARO Techs., Inc., 809 F. App'x 880, 884 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“We
apply regional circuit law when we review a district court's decision to
sanction a litigant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.”).
97

